INTRODUCTION
A recent transplant case raises an interesting question: Should a managed care organization ("MCO") face criminal prosecution when a patient dies after the MCO's decision to deny payment for treatment? Is providing such a legal 2 cause of action the solution, or does doing so just put money into the pockets of attorneys rather than into the hands of the injured health care consumer? As a recent case suggests, bad publicity could be as effective a deterrent as any criminal prosecution in changing an MCO's behavior.
Nataline Sarkisyan was a seventeen-year-old California teenager who died while awaiting a liver transplant for which her insurer had refused to pay.
has since threatened to bring murder or manslaughter charges against CIGNA because, in his words, the insurer did not want to "take the after-care coverage" and in deciding to deny treatment for this reason had "maliciously killed" the girl.
11
The public outcry from this case and the public bias against "greedy" insurers may be what is prompting the criminal liability threat. Managed care 12 has become the new lead paint, tobacco, and gun manufacturer-it is a completely legal industry that is increasingly unpopular with the public. 13 Unlike those industries, however, civil suits against MCOs face an additional hurdle: ERISA preemption. As a consequence, a plaintiff's damages have 14 been limited to reimbursement for expenses, which has been unsatisfactory for many, especially those who have lost loved ones due to treatment denial. 15 Though criminal sanctions would not solve the remedies issue, it could provide the punitive and deterrent aspects for which there seems to have been so much public outcry.
This Note explores the logic behind healthcare insurers' seemingly criminal exempt status, including situations when treatment delay and denial is almost certain to result in death for the insured, and why criminal prosecution is not the answer to the current healthcare debate. The events surrounding Nataline Sarkisyan's death are outlined above for purposes of showing the sensitive nature of such cases and the strong public reaction against the insurer. This paper does not purport to determine whether criminal charges would be warranted in CIGNA's case since many of the facts are in dispute. Part I will explore why a move toward criminal prosecutions seems almost inevitable in light of ERISA's limitations on damages and the public response to the healthcare crisis. Part II will look at why criminal homicide charges against a healthcare insurer seem unlikely to succeed, and Part III will examine why such prosecutions are not the solution to the current healthcare debate. Finally, Part IV will postulate why and how Congress should step in to fill ERISA's gaping holes.
I. THE MOVEMENT FROM CIVIL TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY

A. ERISA
In the past, most disputes against insurers were made via a state law complaint in tort. However, with the evolution of the federal Employee 16 Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") in 1974, many of these cases were removed to federal court under the preemption clause. This preemption 17 signaled a victory for the managed care industry, which once faced potentially ruinous damages exposure under state law. Remedies under ERISA are 18 limited to the cost of the denied treatment, and typically there is no remedy at all if a patient dies as a result of a treatment denial by an MCO. 19 For a period of time the Supreme Court seemed to cut back on ERISA preemption. Nevertheless, in the consolidated cases of Aetna Health Inc. v.
20
Davila and CIGNA HealthCare of Texas, Inc. v. Calad, the Court ruled that ERISA completely preempts state law causes of action for wrongful denial of benefits that involve "pure eligibility decisions." In these cases, a participant 21 and a beneficiary sued their respective Health Maintenance Organizations 
B. Other Factors Leading the Movement
All things considered, managed care litigation may indeed be "the tobacco litigation of the turn of the century." It is clear that public favor of 23 managed care is low, but how the industry got to such a state is less certain.
24
Managed care initially developed as a response to rising health care costs in the 1980s. Corporations that had been induced to provide health care to 25 employees by labor organizations in the 1950s became faced with increasing healthcare costs that were a huge drain on their resources. Complicating the 26 problem was the attitude of employees, many of whom soon came to expect that their employers would provide affordable health care as a benefit of employment. Moreover, physicians, who essentially controlled the entire 27 system, received payment for each test they ran or each drug they prescribed, which led to patient over-treatment, increased costs, and a resulting overburden on employers who had to try and manage those costs but who had no expertise to do so.
28
Under the new managed care scheme, physicians receive a flat fee to cover all patient care. Such a fee system aligns physician interests with those 29 of the employers rather than the patients and removes the physicians' control over the healthcare system. Whereas the prior system encouraged over-30 treatment, the current managed care system arguably encourages physicians to under-treat; physicians who order fewer tests or prescribe fewer drugs can keep the entire fee received from the managed care entity. Under a managed 31 care scheme, there are still Preferred Provider Networks that work under the traditional fee-for-service model, but the more modern trend is toward the capitation system.
32
Possibly the most polarizing feature of managed care is its system of utilization review to cut costs. "Managed care reviewers," who in some cases are not even doctors, usually work for the managed care entity and often end up determining what treatment the patient actually receives. In Sarkisyan's 33 case, CIGNA employed pre-procedure or pre-service review to determine whether Sarkisyan's employer should cover the liver transplant. The 34 determination was made using medical evidence like the guidelines provided by the American Association for the Study of Liver Diseases and the American Society of Transplantation, and internal and independent external review by physician transplant experts. Though utilization review decisions 35 are essentially coverage decisions-making a determination as to whether a treatment is experimental and not covered under the plan-they are also inherently medical decisions, "because in most instances they determine whether or not the insured will receive medical treatment. (1) a legal duty to protect another; (2) a failure to act combined with knowledge or gross negligence; and (3) that such failure be the proximate cause of the death). Robertson continues analyzing criminal liability for homicide by omission, explaining, "if the omission is intentional the person can be prosecuted for first-or second-degree murder depending on the extent of his premeditation and deliberation." Id. at 217-18. injection of this element into the mix as an invasion of the sanctity of the patient-doctor relationship.
37
Despite the criticisms, managed care achieved what employers and society had set out for by keeping health care costs down. Yet it is this cost-38 containment focus and for-profit feature that has also prompted such public scorn. Society does not want financial prowess or wherewithal to influence or impact its health. Anyone facing a health crisis would certainly hope to have access to the best treatments available, regardless of cost. The reality, however, is that healthcare resources are scarce and that treatment often imposes large costs that someone must pay.
Furthermore, the lack of transparency in the healthcare industry itself prompts fear in the hearts of patients who rely on a physician's expertise and knowledge. That is to say, the fact that physicians are conflicted over patient 39 treatment because of financial disincentives in an industry that many lay people do not understand has caused many to point the finger at the industry deemed responsible for this breakdown-the managed care industry itself.
II. THE RISE OF THE CRIMINAL CASE?
Criminal homicide results from either one's intentional acts that result in death, the conscious disregard of the high probability that one's actions will cause death, or the failure to act to prevent death when action is required. It . There are generally three other circumstances when the law invokes a duty to act: (1) when there is a "special relationship" such as between a parent and child; (2) when a person creates a risk for another and then fails to prevent that harm; or (3) when a person who has no legal duty to act voluntarily comes to the aid of another but fails to provide further aid or assistance and, as a result of this failure to act, puts the at-risk individual in a worse position than if no assistance had been undertaken. Id elements of homicide by omission, along with difficulties in handling the tension between the public benefit and the societal discontent with the industry, seriously complicate the situation and decrease the likelihood that such prosecution would be successful.
A. Duty
In the case of criminal homicide by omission, there must be a legal duty to act. Such a duty exists through express or implied contract, such as when 42 a doctor agrees to care for her patient. Once the contract to provide services 43 exists, the provider has an "obligation to perform those services properly." 53. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 572 ("Health insurance essentially involves transferring risk from those insureds, who account for most of health care costs, to low-risk insureds, who pay most of the premiums, through the medium of the insurer."); see also Zinberg, supra note 5 ("Insurers are obliged to preserve resources to pay for subscribers' medical needs. That is, they need to direct a limited pool of cash to treatments most likely to work. If they pay for lots of unproven, experimental, expensive procedures . . . they have less left to pay for proven therapies for other patients.").
54. Robertson, supra note 41, at 235. 55. Id. case, where the MCO "merely" made coverage determinations based on plan provisions, the company's use of utilization management certainly impacted the actual treatment Ms. Sarkisyan received. Nevertheless, whether this 50 contract between an MCO and the insured party truly exists may not be as clear as it seems. Often, as in the case of Nataline Sarkisyan, where the MCO entered into an Administrative Services Only ("ASO") contract with the employer, the MCO "provides administrative services and coordinates clinical procedures, including determining if a plan covers a specific, proposed treatment." As 51 an administrator, an express contract exists between the MCO and the employer, but not between the MCO and the insured. Furthermore, the insurer, like CIGNA in this case, does not fund or pay for the clinical care: the employer does. In order to serve its client-the self-funded employer-the 52 insurer must administer the plan according to the employer's specifications. Thus, any duty owed by the MCO to the insured may be limited to the express terms of the contract, which often contain numerous exceptions. Because of its risk pooling function, all types of insurance carve out exceptions to lower the overall risk and to ensure that there are enough financial resources to provide for all of its covered beneficiaries.
53
If the insurance contract has these exceptions, usually in the form of numerous carve-outs for experimental treatments, an MCO may argue that the "level of necessary care becomes extraordinary in the case of experimental treatments." There is little case law on point regarding the standard of care 54 an insurer might owe to an insured with respect to the nuances of the plan, but typically, "an individual is required to provide only the level of care that society may reasonably expect, given the risk, available means, and likelihood of benefit in the precise circumstances facing the actor." To complicate 55 things further, in reality most contracts do not define the term "medical 56. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 629-30 (discussing the problems with defining medical necessity). CIGNA's Chief Medical Officer would likely reply that there is no such taint in Sarkisyan's case, as CIGNA did not fund and was not financially responsible for payments under the plan. See Kang, supra note 35. However, CIGNA does have a financial incentive to retain the business of its often large corporate clients, and saving those clients money almost certainly plays a role in CIGNA retaining that business.
57 were free to continue using physician incentives and treatment rationing through utilization review. Though ERISA applies only to civil suits, this 65 language may impact the duty analysis in criminal contexts in light of the unique role that for-profit MCOs play in the healthcare environment.
Utilization review and other MCO practices work not only to control costs but also to provide better quality. There is evidence that more treatment is not necessarily better treatment. Dr. David Eddy, a health economist with 66 Duke University, commented on a 1993 California civil case that produced an $89.3 million award for the family of a woman denied an experimental treatment for the breast cancer that ultimately killed her. He expressed his 67 concern that if the "[award was] interpreted to mean that investigational procedures should be covered, that is a disaster, not just for the cost of health care but also for the quality of health care." An MCO's primary function in 68 using utilization review is to avoid harmful treatments by providing a barrier to such unproven treatments.
69
This tension between more treatment and better treatment complicates the duty analysis. Does the insurer have a duty to provide more treatment or to provide what is considered the better treatment? In the case of Nataline Sarkisyan, CIGNA deemed the transplant unproven in its medical benefit and ineffective as treatment and thus recommended that her parent's employer not 70 . 1974) , in which the court held that there was no criminal liability for employee deaths in a plant explosion because "the defendants' actions must be a sufficiently direct cause" of the death); Leavens, supra note 44 ("[T]he law differentiates among the many possible 'but for' causal forces, identifying some as 'necessary conditions'-necessary for the result to occur but not its direct 'cause'-and recognizing others as the 'direct' or 'proximate' cause of the result.").
77 Further complicating the duty analysis is that a duty arising from a contract in the civil arena is not necessarily analogous to the duty owed in a criminal context. Some have suggested that criminal liability be limited to 73 where there is a duty aimed at "preserving life." This duty is more easily 74 attributable to physicians and less likely to apply to managed care entities who must manage care in order to preserve resources for all beneficiaries. Moreover, it is entirely unclear what constitutes a life preserving duty and when one has such a duty. Even if an insurer has a duty to preserve life, it may not have a legal duty to pay for any unproven measure that might preserve life. In homicide-by-omission crimes, the action that one failed to take must have been one that was required, not merely one that was foregone. The scope of 75 the duty to preserve life is therefore somewhat ambiguous.
B. Causation
In addition to the legal duty to act, another essential element of homicide by omission is causation. The causation element required in a criminal case is more than just the actual (or "but for") causation required in civil cases.
76
Even if the omission is the actual cause of the harm, it must also be the proximate (or "legal") cause of the result. Proximate cause requires (holding that the fact that the victim was struck and killed by a truck did not relieve the defendant of the direct causation attributable to him for leaving the drunken robbery victim on an icy road late at night); Leavens, supra note 44, at 564 ("While much of proximate cause analysis has been framed in language that rings of actual or physical causation, this inquiry is hardly objective.").
80 MCO fails to treat a sick patient who ultimately dies, it can be said that "but for" the MCO's failure to pay for the treatment, that patient would have lived. It can also be said, however, that "but for" the original illness the patient would have lived without requiring the treatment at all. In Nataline Sarkisyan's case, many factors could have been the "but for" cause of her death: although being taken off life support was the final physical push closest in time to her death, complications from her bone marrow transplant put her in the coma, which prompted doctors to put her on life support. Furthermore, her initial leukemia treatment was what had required the bone marrow transplant in the first place. It is obvious that the denial of the liver transplant fits somewhere in the causal analysis but it is unclear how much of a role it actually played. 85 . Id. at 573. 86. Id. 87. Id. Leavens states the following example: When, for example, a driver parks a car on a steep hill, it is normal to set the parking brake and put the car in gear. If the driver forgets to do so and the car subsequently rolls down the hill, smashing into another car, we would say that the failure to park properly was a departure from the status quo. This failure, not the visibly steep hill or the predicate act of pulling the car to the curb, was the cause of the collision.
Id.
88. Id.
Id. ("In the [earlier]
example, the driver's failure to park the car in a proper manner caused the accident as surely as if he had actually driven his car into the other."); see also supra text accompanying note 79 (examining the legal cause of harm).
90. Leavens, supra note 44, at 573. 91. Robertson, supra note 41, at 237; see also 40 AM. JUR. 2d Homicide § 19 ("It is equally well settled that the consequences of an act which is the efficient cause of the death of another are not excused, nor is the criminal responsibility for causing death lessened, by the pre-existing physical condition of the person killed, at the time the act was done. . . .").
92. See supra text accompanying note 7. 93. Robertson, supra note 41, at 237.
Professor Arthur Leavens argues that such a view of causation is too limited and thus is fundamentally flawed. The status quo, he says, 85 encompasses much more than just the state of affairs prior to and immediately after the omission. It includes "expected patterns of conduct, including 86 actions designed to avert certain unwanted results." Failure to take action to 87 avoid such results should also be seen as disturbing the status quo. "When 88 such a failure to act is a necessary condition (a "but for" cause) of a particular harm, then that failure fairly can be said to cause that harm." Leavens 89 maintains that omissions do indeed fall into the cause-and-effect model.
90
According to such a view, an insurer who fails to pay for a preventative treatment that might prolong life would be said to proximately cause the ensuing death as long as payment for that treatment is expected. Societal expectations notwithstanding, the contract between the MCO and the employer often excludes certain treatments from coverage, often by only offering to cover that which is deemed to be "medically necessary."
The law seems to agree with Leavens. Most courts have decided that accelerating any death is criminally punishable. In the CIGNA scenario, the 91 denied treatment potentially could have prolonged life for a significant period of time. Thus, CIGNA would hardly be able to argue that Sarkisyan was 92 going to die anyway because of her pre-existing condition. "As the period shortens, however, the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary duties of care becomes relevant." Failing to provide "extraordinary care" (care that 93 94. Id. 95. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 567. A self-insured plan is one that is not backed by an insurance policy. The employer instead funds and administers its benefit plan (i.e., pays claims covered by the benefit plan from its own money). It may outsource or delegate the administration of the plan to a thirdparty administer (TPA) (often an insurance company), but this TPA does not provide the employer with any financial backing or assume any financial risk associated with the claims.
96. Robertson, supra note 41, at 238. 97. See Whelan, supra note 3 (stating, "It's not enough for the insurer to deny coverage . . . . The doctors and the hospital-especially a nonprofit institution like UCLA-must decline to work for free.").
98 is required before one is "preserving life" has not been delineated. In the typical managed care scenario, the MCO simply makes the decision as to whether the insurer, or the employer in a self-insured plan, will pay for the treatment. This determination is made based on the terms of the 95 insurance contract and whether a particular treatment is "covered." The patient's doctors, and sometimes the hospital caring for the patient, also play a role and owe a duty to the patient. A common defense to the issue of causation is therefore "that the omission of a particular defendant should not legally be considered the cause of [a patient's] death because the patient would not have died had the other persons with a duty of care fulfilled their obligations to him." In the case of Nataline Sarkisyan, though CIGNA denied 96 payment for the experimental treatment, the doctors who were pushing for it could have simply provided the treatment and dealt with the issue of payment later. The omission of the doctors could be viewed as a "sufficiently 97 independent intervening cause to break the causal link between the defendant's act and the resulting death." 98 Professor Robertson argues that there are two problems with the intervening cause argument. Though a defendant's omission may not be a 99 sufficient condition of a patient's death, it may be a necessary condition. In Sarkisyan's case, CIGNA's "payment" denial was not an actual "treatment" denial and thus not an independently sufficient cause of her death. It was only because her doctors failed to provide the treatment in the first place that the resulting harm occurred. Robertson goes on to argue that even with merely necessary (and not sufficient) causation, those who fail to act should nevertheless be assigned legal causation. The law in this area, he says, 100 "selects one or more necessary conditions as the legal cause" based on policy 101. Id. (he suggests: "[A] bullet fired from a gun is only one of many conditions that must exist for a human death from shooting . . . . Although firing the gun is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the death, the law justifiably selects that act as the legal cause because the shooting is a point at which social interventions may effectively prevent future deaths by gunfire.").
102. See, e.g., Whelan, supra note 3 (the author, questioning why the hospital did not proceed with the transplant despite the non-payment, questioned a hospital spokesperson who cryptically said that " [t] here have been occasions where UCLA has performed a transplant without compensation" but that payment is always an issue for the patient anyway because of the cost of after-care).
103 108. Leavens, supra note 44, at 576 (explaining how contract law produces a regularity of performance by formalizing and requiring particular standards of conduct).
109. Id. at 575 (suggesting that the duty in the criminal context must rely on "empirically valid expectation[s] that persons in similar circumstances will act to prevent a harm . . . and also a deeply determinations, such as which actor can "prevent future occurrences of that necessary condition and thus the prohibited result." Furthermore, the law 101 will assign causation to the actor who "reasonably foresees or expects that others with a duty to act will not intervene," which would here seem to be the insurance company. The MCO, whose purpose is to keep costs down, knows that most doctors will not treat without assurance of payment unless they are legally required to do so. Under Robertson's theory, the doctors' omission 102 would not be an independent, intervening cause breaking the chain of causation. In fact, it seems as though the doctors' omissions are very much 103 related to the MCO's omissions, and might even be caused thereby.
The cause-and-effect model at this stage "does not differentiate among various persons who should engage in preventive conduct." In order to 104 determine who should act, the law must set out what the expectations are for each individual or corporation, and only when those individuals fail to act as expected should it be said that the proximate cause element has been met. 105 Professor Leavens goes on to urge that causation should be "sharply focused" so that moral indignation does not play a role in assigning blame to those who fail to act when not legally required to do so. The concern over moral ingrained common understanding that society relies on that individual to prevent the harm").
110. Robertson, supra note 41, at 217; see also DRESSLER, supra note 40, at 102 (describing crimes by omission, Dressler explains that the remaining elements of the offense must be proven, including the "requisite mens rea.").
111. 
C. Intent
To prosecute homicide by omission successfully, the person who fails to act must do so "with knowledge or gross negligence." MCOs are artificial 110 entities and it is therefore difficult to attribute a mental state to them. 111 However, the law has held corporations criminally responsible for specific intent crimes in the past under several theories. Typically, a corporation is 112 either responsible for (1) the acts of its employees through respondeat superior, (2) the acts of the highest officials, or (3) "illegal conduct that results from reckless or unreasonable conduct."
113
Though most courts agree that the requisite intent can be impugned to the corporate entity, the approach still has its critics. MCOs are not like other 114 corporations because they often act as intermediaries and perform specific contractual functions. The fact that the MCO may be functioning primarily for the benefit of the employer or for the insured, or for some combination thereof, may make it more difficult to decipher whether any of the MCO's agents or employees had the necessary intent to harm, since working for the benefit of one may oftentimes necessarily harm the other. Thus, without specific statutes or regulatory laws setting standards of conduct for MCOs (aside from ERISA), it will be difficult to impugn the requisite criminal intent to the insurer.
III. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IS NOT THE SOLUTION
Aside from problems with fulfilling the elements of criminal homicide, there are policy problems with expanding the criminal law to cover treatment denials by MCOs. Criminal prosecution would represent yet another example aggressive civil litigation and have been changed thereby (e.g., the tobacco, lead paint, and handgun industries), the managed care industry involves questions of federal preemption and damage limitations under ERISA, which further induces plaintiffs to seek redress through criminal sanctions.
116
Joshua Dressler sees "troubling features" in the current state of homicideby-omission liability. The general homicide statute contains an active-state 117 element-actus reus-that is defined as the "killing of a human being by another human being." It is truly difficult to reconcile CIGNA's actions in 118 Sarkisyan's case to this literal language. Although CIGNA may have allowed the leukemia to kill Nataline, it performed no killing act itself. More fundamentally, characterizing the insurer as a killer, and thereby equating its passivity with the doctor or hospital's passivity or with leukemia's uncontrollable effects, "undermines the concept of individual responsibility and authorship of conduct." In Sarkisyan's case, although her doctors were 119 convinced that the transplant would benefit her, they failed to go through with the treatment without payment. Instead, the hospital required a down 120 payment of Sarkisyan's parents, which they failed to provide. Though all of 121 the actors seem to be culpable in some sense, the law has failed to carefully define expectations in a situation such as Sarkisyan's. Without such clear standards and expectations, the law can hardly punish actors who are not breaking the law.
Dressler analogizes to a case where a woman named Alice allowed her boyfriend, Bob, to beat her daughter to death without doing anything to stop him. He suggests that Alice's liability, if any, should be for violation of Dressler also sees problems with the current state of "commission-byomission" crimes. More specifically, he doubts the logic of equating 127 "positive duties with negative ones." The criminal law punishes for legally 128 culpable acts or non-acts, not for bad character. "At a minimum, there is a 129 serious risk that juries will inadvertently punish people for being (or seeming to be) evil or 'soulless,' rather than for what occurred on a specific occasion." This risk of bias is arguably even greater in the case of an MCO.
130
Almost every member of society has some viewpoint about MCOs and their proper role, yet few of those same people know the intricacies of the business itself. Though it may seem impossible to say that the law would punish an MCO for its "bad character" (since the MCO is not an individual, it is not capable of having a character in the ordinary sense of the word), in reality this is probably even more likely to happen than with an individual actor. When an individual is accused of a crime, jury members can often empathize as fellow human beings, recognizing human limitations and shortcomings. MCOs are unlikely to garner any such support.
Along the same morality line, criminal liability can hardly make MCOs virtuous. "It is worth remembering that the criminal law is not a cure for all of our problems." Like litigation against the tobacco, lead paint, and 131 handgun industries, managed care prosecution represents punishment for managed care serves an important societal function by rationing scarce healthcare resources and by keeping costs low.
One would think that "the government [would] always win[] when it chooses to charge a corporation with a crime" due to the doctrine of respondeat superior, which imputes to the corporation any wrongdoing of an employee. Though this doctrine is quite useful in civil disputes, it does not 133 lend itself so easily to application in the criminal context, where individuals are typically held accountable and punished for their acts or omissions. 134 Furthermore, "Congress has provided no guidance whatsoever about how to determine which acts of which natural persons should be imputed to the artificial 'person' of the corporation for purposes of determining whether it has committed a crime." Many scholars argue that punishing a corporation 135 criminally will not deter criminal behavior, since corporations "have no soul to be damned and no body to be kicked." "The concept of a fictional 136 economic entity simply does not mesh with the four goals of criminal law: deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation." policy behind placing limitations on ERISA damages is that, "because many benefit plans are self-funded, it is the workers' money that would pay the damages." Also, since the corporation is an artificial entity, it cannot be 139 incarcerated. Therefore, large fines will replace prison sentences, and the 140 impact of such penalties will "result in low dividends, fallen stock values, and resorted to litigation in areas of tobacco regulation and gun control, "perhaps out of frustration with the inability to achieve desired public health goals through the legislative branch of government." ERISA is arguably yet 145 another area where the legislative branch has fallen short. However, there is an important difference: by drastically limiting plaintiffs' damages, ERISA has cut off the public health advocates' litigation alternative to shaping public policy.
The criminal law therefore seems to be the only litigation 146 alternative. But many believe that litigation has had a negative impact on consumer health and is a primary reason for increased health care costs. The with litigation in order to shape policy may end up crippling an industry that undeniably serves a public purpose.
151
Furthermore, our Constitution sets roles for each governmental body, and it is the legislature who is charged with shaping public policy. The courts should be limited to interpreting those policies. Courts are ill equipped to 152 devise complex regulatory schemes, which would be necessary in the managed care arena. The Pegram Court noted that the legislative process is the 153 "preferable forum for comprehensive investigations and judgments of social value, such as optimum treatment levels and health-care expenditure." 154 Arguably, even the legislature has failed to regulate in this area out of apathy for the complexity of the healthcare industry. The failure of other branches often drives litigation as public policy, but such an argument does not make the courts any more equipped to shape policy. ERISA may by seen as both 155 a failure and a reflection of the legislature allowing itself to be influenced by the powerful insurance lobby.
While corporate criminal liability still remains controversial, criminal liability for MCOs is appealing because MCO misconduct has the ability to inflict tremendous pain and injury, both in terms of human suffering and financial loss. "Additionally, because the current tort and regulatory 156 penalties apparently have not chilled MCO misconduct, legislators and prosecutors are looking to criminal prosecutions to vindicate state interests in the delivery of health care and the protection of citizens." However, civil 157 litigation can scarcely achieve all the policy goals society seeks. For example, in tobacco litigation, most states hoped to convince the industry to agree to vast regulation, advertising cutbacks, and reimbursement; yet, ultimately they only achieved "pecuniary damages, the goal that litigation is most suited to provide." Criminal prosecution is even less likely to achieve sweeping 158 reform. For example, a former federal prosecutor argues that a corporate 159 indictment inevitably leads to a guilty plea, large fines, and more headlines, none of which guarantee widespread industry change. Furthermore, only 160 corporations with nothing to lose can afford to contest charges in court. 161 These settlements will also likely reflect only the interests of the litigants, and are thus a poor reflection of the public interest. It is also worth noting that 162 as a result of the tobacco settlement, share prices for tobacco companies actually rose, resulting in even more profit for the industry. The benefit of 163 any criminal sanctions is therefore quite uncertain.
Perhaps most unfulfilling about imposing criminal sanctions on the managed care industry is the lack of direction such prosecution provides to MCOs that are actually looking to structure their companies to avoid such punishment. This concern is even greater given the nature of MCOs as for- 164 profit entities serving an important public function. Without legislatively imposed regulations and expectations, MCOs will continue to try to find a way to operate profitably.
IV. OTHER SOLUTIONS
There is an obvious need for Congress to address the shortcomings of ERISA. Although the courts have recently been more progressive in avoiding preemption and allowing more suits to proceed in state court, there are still many questions about ERISA's exact limits on the state's role in health insurance. So far, the courts have recognized a "presumption against 165 [ERISA] preemption where the statute at issue addresses a historic police power of the states-namely, a matter of health and safety." Some states 166 have been testing the boundaries of this presumption through laws aimed at curbing MCO misconduct. Statutes like the Texas Health Care Liability Act 167 permit lawsuits by individuals against MCOs for damages caused by a failure review concludes that a treatment is necessary, the HMO must provide the service. The Illinois act was challenged as preempted by ERISA, but the 170 Supreme Court rejected the argument. Although these laws seem to be 171 going in the right direction, they are far from sufficient, and it is worth noting that none of them would have actually helped Nataline Sarkisyan, as her plan was self-insured and thus not subject to state insurance laws. 172 Though failing to go so far as to clarify or amend ERISA, Congress has responded to the concerns over managed care's cost containment policies through several failed bills aimed at establishing a patient bill of rights. 173 Though none of these measures passed, a failed version of the bill did help to facilitate private lawsuits against HMOs and insurance companies by inspiring states to provide for such causes of action. 174 More appropriate than a patient bill of rights establishing a state right to sue would be a complete Congressional overhaul of ERISA. In the case of Corporate Health Insurance v. Texas Department of Insurance, the Fifth Circuit Judge, recognizing that the Supreme Court had "gone as far as it can go," urged Congress to act "to further define what rights a patient has when he or she has been negatively affected by an HMO's decision to deny medical care . . . and to enact legislation that ensure[s] every patient has access to that care." Congress should federally mandate independent review procedures 175 and provide for such independent review boards in each state. These boards should be made up of neutral physicians of specified credentials who are not affiliated with the managed care entity. If the independent review board rules in an insured's favor, the services should be provided and the insured should be reimbursed for any out of pocket costs. such denials should be provided in writing with data supporting the determination. This independent appeals process should be exhausted before an insured can bring suit. However, if bodily injury is imminent because of the denial or delay, Congress should provide a way for insureds to obtain judicial review of their case.
Furthermore, Congress should adopt a statutory definition of "medical necessity." This definition need not be overly restrictive, as too narrow a 178 definition could not possibly be applicable in all cases. Nevertheless, it should be clear enough so as to provide guidance to MCOs in carving out treatments under their plans, and some level of statutorily defined deference should be given to the treating physician. Finally, ERISA should provide for punitive 179 damages in the case of gross deviation from the regulatory requirements. Because the regulations provide patients with redress before injury, litigation against MCOs would probably not increase in any unmanageable manner.
CONCLUSION
The criminal prosecution of MCOs will simply not achieve the sweeping reform of the industry that society hopes to gain through litigation. Whether it be through patients' rights legislation or an overhaul of ERISA, it is clear that Congress needs to act. If Congress seeks to protect the obvious public benefit that flows from MCOs, it needs to either set standards as to how they should make or deny treatment decisions or provide a federal review mandate with a truly independent review board. Since Congress seems to be 180 concerned that uniform laws be applied in the managed care context, it should establish a uniform review procedure, which would protect the public before treatment is denied. This would avoid litigation that would likely raise the cost of health care to the consumer and cripple an industry that, on the whole, greatly benefits the public.
